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Israel's Political Agenda (I)

Published on 11 April 2013, by M. Tomazy.
"During the last major round of fighting in Gaza in November 2012, for example, the behavior of the Egyptian government under President Mursi was almost indistinguishable from that of governments under President Mubarak in previous such situations. And as long as the Egyptian Army retains its preeminent role in national security policy, that pattern may well continue. At a minimum, however, there is inevitably less predictability about the durability of the peace treaty with Egypt than in the period before the outbreak of “Arab spring.” That is also the case with respect to Jordan. The Hashemite regime, though not totally immune to the currents of unrest sweeping the rest of the region, has thus far managed to stave off or defuse the most serious threats to its viability. However, Jordan has been beset by recurrent large-scale protests, mostly focused on economic concerns (particularly fuel and food price inflation) and corruption but also reflecting discontent at the system of governance. Particularly disconcerting are signs of disaffection among the southern tribes, the traditional mainstay of the Hashemite security establishment. Stability in Jordan is of vital concern to Israel, not only because Jordan provides a physical barrier between Israel and more threatening powers to the east, but also – given the continuing links between the East and West Banks (especially between the Palestinian populations) – because chaos in the East Bank could well spill across the Jordan River into Israeli-controlled areas. At a minimum, the transformation of Jordan into an active confrontation front would pose 
serious challenges to Israeli security planners."

Mark Heller, published through the Israeli  Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)

NB: The Zionist Studies are not necessarily correct, but they lead us to their allies and methods of thinking.
For example, Mark Heller assumes that the toppled Mubarak regime was not an Israel's strong ally, however they might want a more loyal ruler. Heller said:

"Husni Mubarak was not a “friend of Israel.” He never visited Israel (except for a brief appearance at the funeral of Yitzhak Rabin), emptied the peace treaty between the two states of any content apart from the security provisions, and allowed Egyptian media to propagate the most virulent anti-Israel (and anti-Semitic) 
rants at a time when it was forbidden to speculate publicly about the President’s state of health or succession plans. Mubarak did, however, understand Egypt’s national interest to require reasonable 
working ties with the United States and a non-violent relationship with Israel. It is in Israel’s national interest that Mubarak’s successors continue to understand Egypt’s imperatives in the same way, or at least act as though they do, but whether that will be the case remains an open question."